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The	 Spanish	 and	 the	 UK	 constitutional	 orders	 are	 asymmetrical	 as	 to	 the	 level	 of	
autonomy	 that	 the	 various	 regional	 governments	 enjoy	 but	 also	 as	 to	 the	 kind	 of	
relationship	 each	 and	 every	 one	 of	 them	 develops	 with	 the	 metropolitan	 State.	 The	
paper	 provides	 for	 a	 comparative	 analysis	 of	 the	 role	 that	 the	 (sub-)constitutional	
statutes	 play	 in	 Spain	 and	 the	 UK	 in	 reflecting	 political	 asymmetries	 and	 creating	
constitutional	ones.	It	argues	that	the	processes	that	led	to	the	drafting	of	the	relevant	
documents	have	taken	into	account	those	very	different	political	aspirations	that	certain	
ethnic	 and	 political	 communities	 had	 in	 those	 countries.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	
distribution	 of	 competences	 between	 the	 various	 tiers	 as	 regulated	 by	 those	 statutes	











political	 asymmetries	 by	 creating	 constitutional	 structures	 that	 are	 more	 ‘open’	 and	
flexible	than	the	ones	of	mature	federations	such	as	the	USA,	Germany	and	Switzerland.	
In	 the	 case	 of	 the	UK,	 this	 is	 rather	 unsurprising	 given	 the	 idiosyncratic	 nature	 of	 its	
uncodified	 constitution.	 In	 Spain,	 although	 there	 is	 a	 codified	 constitution,	 it	 is	
particularly	laconic	with	regard	to	its	territorial	aspect.	So,	in	both	cases,	one	has	to	look	
at	 the	 relevant	 (sub-)constitutional	 statutes	 in	 order	 to	 understand	 the	 specific	
constitutional	 relation	 that	exists	between	 the	respective	region	and	 the	metropolitan	
state.	
















The	 current	 paper	 focuses	 on	 the	 role	 of	 the	 Spanish	 and	 the	 UK	 (sub-
)constitutional	statutes	within	the	respective	constitutional	orders.	 It	does	so	 in	order	
to	understand	how	those	texts	reflect	the	political	asymmetries	that	exist	within	those	
States.	 More	 importantly,	 it	 analyses	 how	 those	 political	 asymmetries	 are	 translated	
into	 constitutional	 asymmetries	 as	 to	 the	 level	 of	 autonomy	 that	 the	 various	 regional	
governments	 enjoy.	 The	 existence	 of	 such	 constitutional	 asymmetries	 is	 rather	
unavoidable	 if	 one	 takes	 into	 account	 the	 very	 diverse	 processes	 that	 led	 to	 the	




as	 the	 very	 different	 historical	 and	 political	 necessities	 that	 led	 to	 the	 devolution	 in	
Northern	Ireland,	Scotland	and	Wales.	It	shows	how	the	drafting	processes	reflect	such	
differentiation.	Section	3	explains	how	the	(sub-)constitutional	documents	may	account	
for	 the	 difference	 in	 the	 level	 of	 legislative	 autonomy	 that	 the	 different	 regional	
governments	 enjoy	 by	 analysing	 their	 pivotal	 role	 in	 the	 internal	 distribution	 of	
competences	 and	 responsibilities.	 As	 a	 final	 point,	 the	 paper	 suggests	 that	 the	





‘Historically,	 Spain	 emerged	 from	 a	 process	 that	 involved	 the	 unification	 of	 different	
kingdoms	and	territories	[…]	Its	constituent	units	[…]	had	and	continue	to	have	strong	
cultural	 identities,	 including	 different	 languages.’ 4 	Especially,	 the	 Euskadi	 (Basque	
country)	and	Catalunya	have	had	a	 tradition	of	nationalist	movements	 that	 fought	 for	
political	 autonomy.5	This	 is	 why	 the	 Second	 Spanish	 Republic	 (1931–1936)	 tried	 to	
accommodate	 the	 territorial	 problem	 by	 the	 enactment	 of	 regional	 Statutes	
guaranteeing	a	certain	degree	of	political	autonomy.6	In	fact,	Catalunya	in	1932	and	the	
Euskadi	 (Basque	 country)	 four	 years	 later	 ‘were	 granted	 self-government,	 after	
referenda	[sic]	were	held	in	those	regions.’7	
However,	 Franco’s	 dictatorship	 put	 a	 violent	 end	 to	 this	 ‘regionalist	 spring.’	
Franco	 imposed	 an	 unbending	 and	 repressive	 policy	 of	 state	 centralism	 in	 Spain	 for	
almost	 four	 decades.	 So,	 as	 part	 of	 post-Franco	 democratisation	 and	 as	 a	 means	 of	
balancing	 powerful	 regional	 interests	 fostered	 by	 the	 revived	 Basque	 and	 Catalan	
nationalisms,	Spain	pursued	anew	a	process	of	regionalisation.	The	result	of	it	has	been	
a	 negotiated	 settlement	 that	 is	 known	 as	 the	 Estado	 de	 las	 Autonomías.8	This	 hybrid	















practice,’12	as	 an	order	 that	 exhibits	 ‘virtual	 federalism,’13	‘federalism	 in	 the	making’14	
and	‘unfulfilled	federalism.’15	








with	 common	 historic,	 cultural	 and	 economic	 characteristics,	 insular	 territories	 and	
provinces	 with	 a	 historic	 regional	 status’	 had	 the	 right	 to	 become	 self-governing	
Communities	(Comunidades	Autónomas).18	If	 they	decided	to	do	so,	 they	could	assume	
the	competence	to	legislate	over	a	list	of	areas	that	are	enumerated	in	Articles	148	and	








assume	 a	 relatively	 small	 set	 of	 competences	 enumerated	 in	 Article	 148	 of	 the	
Constitution.	It	could	only	assume	further	competences	and	thus	achieve	a	‘higher	level’	
autonomy	 at	 a	 later	 stage	 (at	 least	 five	 years	 afterwards)	 by	 actually	 amending	 its	
Estatuto.	On	the	other	hand,	an	Autonomous	Community	that	followed	the	‘rapid	route’,	
could	reach	the	highest	level	of	self-government	immediately.	
In	 order	 to	 achieve	 the	 highest	 level	 of	 autonomy,	 the	 relevant	 region	 had	 to	
surpass	a	number	of	procedural	hurdles.	Most	importantly,	according	to	Article	151,	the	
citizens	in	the	region	had	to	support	in	a	referendum	the	initiative	to	follow	the	‘rapid	
route.’	 If	 the	 initiative	 received	 the	 necessary	 support,	 the	 voters	would	 also	 have	 to	
ratify	 the	 Statute	 of	 Autonomy	 in	 a	 second	 subsequent	 referendum.	 However,	 this	
cumbersome	 procedure	 did	 not	 apply	 to	 the	 three	 regions	 that	 had	 enjoyed	 self-





















constitution	 (Disposición	 Transitoria	 2a),	 the	 regions	 that	 had	 already	 approved	 a	





to	 the	 division	 of	 the	 whole	 Spanish	 territory	 into	 17	 Autonomous	 Communities	
(Comunidades	 Autónomas) 20 	and	 2	 ‘autonomous	 cities.’ 21 	Apart	 from	 the	 three	
nacionalidades	 históricas	 that	 followed	 the	 exceptional	 transitional	 procedure,	
Andalucía	 opted	 for	 the	 cumbersome	 ‘rapid	 route’	 of	 Article	 151	 as	 well.	 Finally,	
Navarra	had	access	to	autonomy	through	a	special	organic	law	adopted	by	the	Spanish	




necessary	 requirement	 for	 the	establishment	of	 a	 certain	Comunidad	Autónoma.24	The	




The	 Tribunal	 Constitucional	 has	 underlined	 that	 an	 Estatuto	 is	 an	 act	 that	 cannot	 be	
disposed	 of	 by	 the	 sole	 will	 of	 the	 national	 State	 or	 of	 the	 respective	 Comunidad	
Autónoma.26	So,	within	 the	Spanish	constitutional	order,	 the	Statutes	of	Autonomy	are	
both	 the	 ‘highest	 norm	 of	 the	 region 27 	and	 a	 government	 law	 subject	 to	 the	
constitution.’28	They	 are	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 what	 has	 been	 called	 as	 the	 ‘bloque	 de	
constitucionalidad’	(constitutional	bloc).29	
In	that	sense,	the	Estatutos	as	the	‘basic	institutional	rule	of	each	Self-governing	
Community’30	may	 include	 additional	 contents	 but	 they	 still	 have	 to	 comply	with	 the	
provisions	 of	 the	 Constitution.31	In	 its	 famous	decision	 on	 the	 2006	Catalan	Estatut,32	
the	Constitutional	Court	made	clear	that	
statutes	of	Autonomy	are	rules	subordinated	 to	 the	Constitution,	as	 it	
[sic]	corresponds	to	normative	provisions	that	are	not	an	expression	of	





























The	 UK	 constitution	 has	 gradually	 evolved	 over	 centuries	 without	 having	 ever	 been	
codified	 in	one	 single	document.	 ‘It	 represents	 a	 cluster	 of	 statutes,	 treaties,	 common	
law	and	constitutional	conventions.’36	It	consists	of	‘the	set	of	laws,	rules	and	practices	
that	create	the	basic	institutions	of	the	State,	and	its	component	and	related	parts,	and	
stipulate	 the	 powers	 of	 those	 institutions	 and	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 different	
institutions	and	between	those	institutions	and	the	individual.’37	Within	this	rather	fluid	
constitutional	landscape	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	UK	judiciary	has	recognised	the	
‘fundamental	 constitutional	 nature’	 of	 the	 UK	 Devolution	 Acts, 38 	which	 are	 the	
foundational	 documents	 of	 the	 three	 devolved	 legislatures	 and	 executives	 of	 the	 UK.	
Having	said	that,	the	demands	and	the	processes	that	led	to	the	establishment	of	those	







and	 until	 the	 end	 of	 the	 20th	 century	 the	 UK	 was	 governed	 as	 a	 centralist	 State.	
Notwithstanding,	 the	 region	 managed	 to	 retain	 its	 own	 legal	 system	 and	 different	
system	 of	 education.	 And	 because	 Scotland’s	 distinct	 system	 of	 law,	 education	 and	
church	 have	 been	 ‘allied	 to	 a	 tradition	 of	 nationalism,	 with	 a	 minority	 seeking	
independence’,40	the	devolution	process	was	particularly	welcomed	there.	In	fact,	in	the	
Scottish	 devolution	 referendum	 of	 1997	 3	 out	 4	 voters	 voted	 in	 favour	 of	 the	
establishment	of	a	Scottish	Parliament.	
The	Scottish	Parliament	and	the	Scottish	Government	in	their	modern	form	were	
founded	by	 the	 Scotland	Act	 1998.	Unlike,	 the	 Spanish	 case,	where	 the	 regions	 had	 a	
very	significant	role	 in	the	drafting	of	 the	Statutes	of	Autonomy,	 this	Act	has	been	the	
product	 of	 a	 rather	 top-down	 process.	 This	 was	 changed	 during	 the	 first	 major	





















that	 led	 to	 the	 drafting	 and	 adoption	 of	 the	 Scotland	 Act	 2016.	 In	 the	 wake	 of	 the	




Commission	 that	 comprised	 of	 representatives	 of	 all	 five	 parties	 represented	 in	 the	
Scottish	 Parliament	 was	 asked	 to	 produce	 recommendations	 for	 further	 devolution,	
which	 were	 published	 in	 November	 2014.	 Most	 of	 the	 recommendations	 of	 the	
Commission	have	been	adopted	 in	the	Scotland	Act	2016	underlining	the	 fact	 that	 the	







According	 to	 it,	 the	 Westminster	 ‘would	 not	 normally	 legislate	 in	 areas	 devolved	 to	
Scotland	without	the	consent	of	the	Scottish	Parliament.’42	Since	its	inception,	‘the	scope	
of	the	convention	has	evolved	so	as	to	require	the	consent	of	the	Scottish	Parliament	not	
only	where	 the	UK	Parliament	 seeks	 to	 legislate	 in	devolved	policy	areas,	but	beyond	
that	where	a	UK	bill	seeks	to	vary	the	legislative	competence	of	the	Scottish	Parliament	
or	the	executive	competence	of	the	Scottish	Ministers.’43	The	consent	motion	concerning	
the	passage	of	the	Scotland	Bill	 in	2011	was	 ‘worded	in	conditional	terms,	 inviting	the	
UK	Government	first	to	consider	the	amendments	and	proposals	made	by	the	Scotland	
Bill	 Committee	at	Holyrood	and	 then	 later	 to	 return	with	an	amended	bill	 for	 further	
debate	in	a	second	legislative	consent	motion.’44	The	result	was	a	new	bill	which	sought	
conciliation	 between	 the	 two	 positions	 and	 which	 led	 to	 the	 successful	 grant	 of	 a	
consent	motion.	
The	 new	 Scotland	 Act	 sets	 the	 ‘Sewel	 convention’	 into	 statutory	 footing45	and	
declares	 that	 the	 Scottish	 Government	 and	 Parliament	 are	 ‘a	 permanent	 part	 of	 the	
United	Kingdom’s	constitutional	arrangement.’46	With	regard	to	the	former,	there	was	a	
question	whether	 the	 codification	of	 the	 convention	meant	 that	 the	Westminster	was	


















Be	that	as	 it	may,	still,	 those	developments	can	be	seen	as	 ‘significant	cracks	 in	
what	has	traditionally	been	a	monolithic	acceptance	[…]	of	Westminster’s	untrammeled	
legislative	power.’48	In	fact,	one	might	wonder	whether	those	new	provisions	challenge	




‘Wales	 has	 been	 closely	 integrated	 with	 England	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 law	 and	
administration	since	the	late	Middle	Ages.50	This	explains	to	a	certain	extent	why	there	
has	 never	 been	 an	 equivalent	 level	 of	 popular	 demand	 for	 devolution	 as	 existed	 in	
Scotland.	In	fact,	the	initial	attempt	to	establish	a	devolved	legislature	in	the	70s	failed.	





The	 drafting	 of	 the	 Government	 of	 Wales	 Act	 1998	 was	 largely	 a	 top-down	
process.	 The	 main	 difference	 was	 that	 the	 little	 demand	 for	 significant	 political	
autonomy	was	reflected	in	the	very	limited	competences	of	this	devolved	legislature	as	
we	shall	see	in	the	next	section.	Four	years	after	the	creation	of	the	National	Assembly	
of	 Wales,	 the	 then	 First	 Minister	 Ivor	 Richard	 created	 a	 Commission	 to	 consider	
whether	the	powers	of	the	Assembly	were	adequate	to	the	people	of	Wales.	The	Richard	
Commission	 was	 partly	 comprised	 of	 independent	 Commissioners	 and	 partly	 of	
appointees	 from	 the	 four	 elected	 parties	 to	 the	 Assembly.	 Westminster	 took	 into	
account	 the	 report	 of	 the	 Commission	 when	 it	 decided	 to	 enhance	 the	 Assembly’s	
powers	by	enacting	the	Government	of	Wales	Act	2006.	In	order	the	Assembly	to	obtain	
an	 enhanced	 level	 of	 autonomy,	 two-thirds	 of	 its	 members	 had	 to	 pass	 a	 resolution	
requesting	 that	 primary-law	 making	 powers	 are	 transferred	 to	 it.	 In	 addition,	 this	
proposal	 had	 to	 gain	 the	 support	 of	 the	 Welsh	 voters	 in	 a	 referendum.51	Indeed,	 in	
February	 2010	 the	 Assembly	 passed	 such	 resolution	 and	 one	 year	 later	 the	 Welsh	
voters	supported	such	initiative	by	63.5%.	
The	 regional	 political	 community	 became	 even	 more	 involved	 in	 the	 next	
amendment	 of	 the	Welsh	 arrangement.	 The	 coalition	 government	 of	 Conservatives	 –	





November	2012	and	one	on	 legislative	matters	published	 in	March	2014.	The	 former	
led	 to	 the	 adoption	 of	Wales	Act	 2014,	which	 contains	 very	 similar	 provisions	 to	 the	
Scotland	Act	2012.	The	latter	led	to	the	St	David’s	Day	process	and	the	Wales	Act	2017.	
That	cross-party	debate	put	forward	a	number	of	recommendations.	Those	include	‘the	












From	 a	 modest	 top-down	 initiative,	 the	 Welsh	 devolution	 has	 become	 a	







policy	 coming	 out	 of	 a	 political	 party’s	manifesto.	 It	 is	 one	 facet	 of	 the	 ‘Good	 Friday	
Agreement’	(also	known	as	 ‘Belfast	Agreement’),	a	peace	settlement	 intended	to	bring	
an	 end	 to	 an	 era	 of	 political	 violence	 also	 known	 as	 ‘The	 Troubles.’	 Neither	 does	 it	
signify	the	first	time	that	devolution	has	been	used	in	this	troubled	part	of	the	world.	In	
fact,	the	Government	of	Ireland	Act	1920	set	up	the	Stormont	Parliamentary	system	of	
devolved	 government	 that	 functioned	 until	 March	 1972.	 Having	 failed	 to	 effectively	
address	 the	 needs	 of	 the	 nationalist	 community,	 it	 was	 suspended	 by	 Westminster	
during	the	first	years	of	‘The	Troubles’	and	Northern	Ireland	was	directly	governed	by	
London	since	then.	
So,	 one	 of	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 ‘Belfast	 Agreement’	 was	 to	 restore	 devolved	
government.53 	However,	 this	 new	 devolution	 arrangement	 had	 ‘to	 ensure	 that	 all	





was	 itself	 reached,	after	much	travail,	 in	an	attempt	 to	end	decades	of	
bloodshed	and	centuries	of	antagonism.	The	solution	was	seen	to	lie	in	
participation	 by	 the	 unionist	 and	 nationalist	 communities	 in	 shared	
political	 institutions,	without	precluding	…	a	popular	decision	 at	 some	
time	in	the	future	on	the	ultimate	political	status	of	Northern	Ireland.55	
Starting	 from	 the	 latter,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 point	 out	 that	 ‘Westminster	 has	 formally	
conceded	 that	Northern	 Ireland	can	 secede	 from	 the	United	Kingdom	 to	 join	a	united	
Ireland,	 if	 its	 people,	 and	 the	people	 of	 the	 Irish	Republic,	 voting	 separately,	 agree	 to	
this.’56	Section	1	of	the	Northern	Ireland	Act	1998	is	a	rare	example	of	a	provision	of	a	
constitutional	statute	explicitly	recognising	the	right	of	secession	of	a	region.	It	was	the	
only	 Devolution	 Act	 that	 contained	 such	 a	 provision	 underlining	 the	 very	 distinctive	



















and	 its	 counterparts	 has	 to	 do	 with	 its	 consociational	 characteristics. 57 	The	
requirements	 for	 cooperation	 between	 the	 two	 ethno-religious	 segments	 is	 evident	
inter	 alia	 in	 the	 government	 formation	 provisions58	and	 in	 the	 special	 arrangements	
that	 govern	how	 legislation	 is	made.	 ‘Various	measures,	 such	as	 financial	 legislation59	








nature.’63	Having	 said	 that,	 one	 has	 also	 to	 appreciate	 that	 their	 autonomy	 is	 not	
unconstrained.	In	its	famous	decision	on	the	Catalan	Estatut,	the	Tribunal	Constitucional	
reinstated	 that	 the	 statutes	 of	 Autonomy	 have	 to	 conform	with	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	
constitution.64	Given	the	idiosyncratic	character	of	the	uncodified	UK	constitution,	there	
is	 no	 constitutional	 text	 that	 the	Devolution	Acts	 have	 to	 comply	with	 as	 such.	 If	 one	
follows,	 however,	 a	 traditional	 Diceyan	 view	 of	 parliamentary	 sovereignty,	 then	 s/he	
might	 say	 that	 –	 in	 theory	 at	 least-	Westminster	 can	 intervene	 in	 all	 areas	 and	 even	
abolish	the	devolved	institutions.	Politically	speaking,	this	would	be	unthinkable	given	
the	 democratic	 legitimacy	 with	 which	 those	 arrangements	 have	 been	 endowed.	 But	
even	 constitutionally	 speaking,	 this	 position	 has	 become	 somewhat	 untenable	 given	
that	 the	 new	 Scotland	 Act	 provides	 for	 the	 permanence	 of	 the	 Scottish	 institutions.	
However,	the	recent	decision	in	Miller	casts	some	doubt	as	to	what	is	the	added	value	of	
the	legal	codification	of	those	political	conventions.	
Be	 that	as	 it	may,	 those	 (sub-)constitutional	 statutes	play	also	a	pivotal	 role	 in	
accommodating	 the	 different	 political	 aspirations	 of	 the	 various	 ethnic,	 religious,	
political,	linguistic	communities	that	live	in	those	pluri-national	States.	They	reflect	a	de	
facto	political	asymmetry	that	exists.	Especially,	 the	drafting	processes	that	have	been	
used	 for	 the	constitutional	 statutes	of	 the	various	Spanish	and	UK	regions	have	 taken	
into	 account	 the	 particular	 set	 of	 conditions	 that	 have	 led	 to	 the	 quest	 for	 legislative	
autonomy	of	those	regions.	
In	Spain,	 this	has	 taken	place	 through	a	rather	more	systematic	process	 that	 is	
provided	by	the	constitution	itself.	The	drafters	of	the	constitution	were	mindful	of	the	
different	 historical	 and	 political	 trajectories	 that	 the	 comunidades	 históricas	 have	
















England	 that	 possesses	 85%	 of	 the	 population	 has	 neither	 a	 parliament	 nor	 an	
assembly.	More	 importantly,	 the	 very	 different	 political	 realities	 that	 led	 to	 each	 and	
every	constitutional	arrangement	is	reflected	in	the	drafting	process	and	the	contest	of	







What	 is	common	 for	all	 three	UK	arrangements	 is	 that	devolution	 is	 ‘a	process	
not	 an	 event.’65	This	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 initial	 constitutional	 statutes	 for	
Scotland	and	Wales	have	been	amended	 in	order	 to	 further	respond	to	 the	needs	and	
demands	 of	 the	 Scottish	 and	 Welsh	 political	 communities.	 But	 also,	 in	 the	 case	 of	










While	 in	a	number	of	States	with	 legislative	regions,	 the	Constitution	provides	 for	 the	
distribution	 of	 competences	 between	 the	 various	 tiers,66	in	 Spain,	 ‘the	 constitutional	
design	is	neither	exact	nor	complete.’67	The	Constitution	lists	three	sets	of	competences:	
those	 that	exclusively	belong	to	 the	central	government;68	those	 that	may	be	assumed	
by	the	Autonomous	Communities	through	their	Statutes	of	Autonomy;69	and	those	that	
may	 be	 devolved	 from	 the	 central	 government	 to	 the	 Autonomous	 Communities	
through	 organic	 laws.70	In	 addition,	 the	Comunidades	Autónomas	may	 also	 assume	 all	
those	 powers	 that	 are	 not	 explicitly	 allocated	 to	 the	 State.71	Finally,	 ‘[j]urisdiction	 on	
matters	not	claimed	by	Statutes	of	Autonomy	fall	with	the	State.’72	
Clearly,	because	of	the	 ‘open’	nature	of	the	Spanish	system	of	competences,	the	
Statutes	 of	 Autonomy	 are	 necessary	 to	 complement	 the	 Constitution.	 ‘As	 provided	 in	
Article	147(2)(d)	of	the	Constitution,	the	Statutes	of	Autonomy	are	the	rules	whose	role	
it	 is	 to	 establish	 “the	 competences	 assumed	within	 the	 framework	 established	 in	 the	
















state	 laws	 to	 which	 the	 Constitution	 refers	 in	 order	 to	 frame	 the	 distribution	 of	
powers’74	to	form	part	of	the	so-called	bloque	de	constitucionalidad.	In	fact,	the	Spanish	





of	 the	 Autonomous	 Community,	 in	 which	 competences	 are	 assumed,	
that	shall	be	decisive.	[…]75	
The	constitutional	reliance	on	the	Statutes	of	Autonomy	and	the	political	asymmetries	
between	 the	 nacionalidades	 históricas	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 and	 the	 other	 regions	 on	 the	






the	 Autonomous	 Communities	 that	 followed	 the	 ‘normal	 route’	 could	 only	 assume	 a	
relatively	 small	 set	of	 competences	enumerated	 in	Article	148	of	 the	Constitution.	On	
the	 other	 hand,	 Catalunya,	 Euskadi	 (Basque	 country)	 and	 Galicia	 that	 used	 the	
Transitional	Provision	and	Andalucía	that	used	 the	 ‘rapid	route’	 could	also	assume	the	
powers	 provided	 by	 Article	 149.	 As	 time	went	 by,	 and	 after	 the	 period	 of	 five	 years	
elapsed,	even	the	low	autonomy	regions	have	progressively	assumed	the	vast	majority	
of	 the	 available	 competences.	 So,	 the	 constitutional	 asymmetry	 has	 been	 reduced	
between	those	regions	which	assumed	their	powers	 through	the	 ‘rapid	route’	and	the	
rest.	This	does	not	mean,	however,	that	they	are	extinct.	
The	 prime	 example	 of	 constitutional	 asymmetry	 in	 Spain	 relates	 with	 the	
financing	system	of	the	Basque	Country	and	Navarra.	The	common	regime	for	financing	
the	 Comunidades	 Autónomas	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 those	 two	 regions.	 Their	 special	
financing	arrangements	of	those	two	regions	are	called	the	Convenio	in	Navarra	and	the	
Concierto	in	 the	Basque	Country.	They	provide	 for	 the	most	extensive	revenue	raising	
powers	in	Spain.	
Additional	 provision	 One	 (dispocisión	 adicional	 primera)	 of	 the	 Spanish	


















their	 expenditure	without	 any	 transfer	 from	 the	 central	 government.	 Instead,	 a	 fixed	
amount	 of	 the	 revenue	 that	 those	 governments	 collect	 has	 to	 be	 transferred	 to	 the	
central	 government	 as	 a	 contribution	 to	 general	 charges.	 These	 negative	 charges	 are	
called	cupo	 [quota]	in	the	case	of	 the	Basque	country	and	aportación	 [contribution]	 in	
the	case	of	Navarra.	
On	 the	 other	 hand,	 under	 the	 so-called	 ‘common	 system’	which	 applies	 to	 the	







But	 it	 is	 not	 only	 in	 the	 area	 of	 fiscal	 autonomy	 that	 there	 is	 an	 important	
constitutional	asymmetry.	Even	in	the	area	of	external	relations	there	are	asymmetries	
largely	 because	 of	 the	 expansive	 approach	 that	 has	 been	 used	 in	 some	 Statutes	 of	
Autonomy.	According	to	the	Spanish	Constitution	the	central	government	has	exclusive	
competences	over	international	relations,79	including	treaty-making,80	and	the	sub-state	
level	 lacks	 powers	 to	 sign	 international	 agreements	 or	 treaties.	 Notwithstanding,	
different	 Statutes	 of	 Autonomy	 have	 included	 special	 provisions	 on	 the	 foreign	
promotion	 of	 culture	 or	 vernacular	 languages,81	international	 contacts	 with	 overseas	
migrant	 communities82	and	 foreign	 aid.83	The	 Basque	 government	 has	 gone	 as	 far	 as	
openly	 arguing	 ‘for	 a	 limited	 understanding	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 international	 relations	
that	 reduces	 it	 to	 formal	 diplomatic	 representation,	 war	 and	 peace	 issues	 and	 the	
signing	of	treaties.’84	It	considers	most	of	everything	else	as	domestic	activities	and	thus	
that	 it	 is	 entitled	 to	 be	 active.	 Equally,	 Chapters	 II	 and	 III	 of	 the	 Catalan	Estatut	 that	
came	 into	effect	 in	August	2006	provide	 for	quite	an	ambitious	 list	of	competences	of	
the	 Generalitat	 de	 Catalunya	 in	 the	 international	 sphere.	 For	 instance,	 Article	 195	
foresees	 that	 the	 Catalan	 administration	 ‘may	 sign	 collaboration	 agreements	 in	 areas	






in	 order	 to	 operate	 the	 framework	 of	 powers	 is	 the	 one	 of	 the	 United	 Kingdom.	



















beginning.	 Its	 powers	 are	 defined	negatively.	 According	 to	 Section	29	 of	 Scotland	Act	
1998,	 it	may	 legislate	 on	 areas	 that	 are	 not	 considered	 as	 ‘reserved’	 competences	 of	
Westminster.	 Those	 are	 enlisted	 in	 Schedule	 5	 of	 Scotland	 Act	 1998.	 Thus,	 in	 a	way,	
Scotland	has	residual	powers	over	the	competences	that	are	not	explicitly	allocated	to	
Westminster.	The	latter	include:	international	relations,	energy,	aspects	of	road,	rail	and	





Devolution,	however,	 is	 ‘a	process	not	 an	event.’	 So,	 the	Scotland	Act	has	been	
amended	twice	so	far	to	the	effect	that	the	Scottish	Parliament	has	increased	its	powers	
especially	 in	 the	 area	 of	 fiscal	 autonomy.	 The	 Scotland	 Act	 2012	 implemented	 the	
recommendation	of	 the	Calman	Commission	according	 to	which	 ‘a	big	enough	part	of	
[the]	budget	[of	 the	Scottish	Parliament	should]	come	from	devolved	taxation	for	 it	 to	




important	 reform	 of	 the	 financing	 of	 the	 Scottish	 devolution	 did	 not	 go	 as	 far	 as	
providing	for	the	power	of	the	Scottish	legislature	to	control	of	the	rates	and	bands	of	
the	income	tax.	








‘Devolution	 in	 Wales	 has	 been	 in	 a	 constant	 flux	 since	 1998.’90	Initially,	 the	 Welsh	
Assembly	was	not	a	 law-making	body	equivalent	to	the	Scottish	Parliament.	Unlike	 its	
counterpart	 in	Scotland	whose	competences	have	been	defined	negatively,	Schedule	2	
of	 the	 Government	 of	 Wales	 Act	 1998	 enumerated	 the	 very	 limited	 powers	 of	 the	
Assembly.	More	importantly,	the	Assembly	could	not	pass	primary	legislation,	but	only	
subordinate	legislation	of	specific	relevance	to	Wales.91	This	changed	eight	years	later.	
The	 Government	 of	 Wales	 Act	 2006	 ‘granted	 the	 Welsh	 Assembly	 Government	 the	














The	 2006	 Act,	 however,	 did	 not	 just	 allow	 for	 a	 modest	 extension	 to	 the	
competences	 of	 the	National	 Assembly.	 It	 also	 provided	 for	 a	 procedure	 according	 to	
which	the	Assembly	could	assume	wider	powers	to	make	primary	legislation	in	certain	
enumerated	 areas.93	According	 to	 it,	 following	 a	 resolution	 passed	 by	 the	 Assembly	
requesting	primary	 law-making	powers	 to	be	devolved	 to	Wales,	 the	proposal	 had	 to	
receive	the	support	of	the	electorate	in	a	referendum.	Indeed,	the	Assembly	passed	such	
a	 resolution	 in	 February	 2010,	 and	 the	 referendum	 took	 place	 a	 year	 later.	 In	March	
2011,	 the	63.5%	of	 the	Welsh	voters	approved	 the	proposal.	As	a	 result,	 the	National	
Assembly	for	Wales	was	able	to	pass	laws	without	first	needing	the	agreement	of	the	UK	
Parliament.	




‘reserved	 powers	model,’	 provides	 for	 the	 permanence	 of	 the	Welsh	 institutions	 and	




The	Northern	 Ireland	Act	 1998	 is	 one	 facet	 of	 a	wider	 peace	 agreement	 plan.	 In	 that	
sense,	the	competences	devolved	to	Stormont	reflect	the	tentative	nature	of	devolution.	
Section	6	of	the	Act	provides	that	the	Assembly	has	power	to	pass	primary	legislation	in	
all	matters	 that	 are	not	 expressly	 excluded	 from	 its	powers.	 So,	 the	Devolution	Act	 is	
following	a	similar	arrangement	to	the	Scottish	and	Welsh	ones	according	to	which	the	
Assembly	possesses	residual	powers.	However,	while	Schedule	2	enlists	those	‘excepted	
matters’	 that	 are	 considered	 as	 central	 state	 powers,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Northern	 Ireland	




can	effectively	prove	 that	 they	can	cooperate.	During	 the	 first	years	of	 the	devolution	
that	 has	 been	 proved	 particularly	 difficult.	 In	 fact,	 the	 Assembly	 was	 suspended	 in	
October	2002	‘amidst	allegations	that	Sinn	Féin	party	officials	were	using	their	access	to	
Stormont	 to	 gain	 information	 useful	 to	 Provisional	 IRA.’95	Devolution	was	 restored	 in	
2007	in	the	aftermath	of	the	St	Andrews	Agreement	in	2006.	The	restoration	of	powers	
led	 to	 further	 transfer	 of	 powers	 to	 Stormont.	 Following	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	
Department	 of	 Justice	 in	 April	 2010,	 the	 ‘reserved	 powers’	 of	 policing,	 prisons	 and	
criminal	law	were	devolved.	Despite	the	unstable	and	conflictual	character	of	Northern	
Irish	 political	 system,	 a	 further	 Stormont	 Agreement	 in	 December	 2014	 on	 conflict-
related	legacy	issues	paved	the	way	for	‘legislation	to	devolve	the	power	to	set	the	rate	












In	 this	 section,	 we	 noted	 the	 significant	 role	 that	 the	 Spanish	 and	 UK	 (sub-
)constitutional	 statutes	 play	 in	 the	 distribution	 of	 competences.	 According	 to	 Viver,	
there	is	a		
failure	 to	 complete	 the	 constitutionalisation	 of	 the	 system	 of	 political	
decentralization,	 that	 is,	 to	 incorporate	 into	 the	 Spanish	 Constitution	
provisions	 pertaining	 to	 the	 territorial	 power	 structure.	 Whereas	 in	
other	 constitutions	 such	 provisions	 normally	 appear	 in	 the	 federal	






result	 of	 the	 pluri-national	 character	 of	 those	 States	 has	 led	 to	 a	 de	 jure	asymmetry	
‘which	 implies	 the	 setting-up	 of	 legal-formal	 differences	 between	 the’	 sub-state	














of	 asymmetrical	 devolution	 such	 as	 Spain	 and	 the	 UK.	 The	 pragmatic	 constitutional	
solutions	that	characterise	both	the	Spanish	and	the	UK	systems	represent	an	attempt	
to	 reconcile	 calls	 for	 regional	 autonomy	 with	 a	 desire	 to	 retain	 the	 borders	 of	 the	
Nation-State.	
In	order	to	achieve	this	important	goal,	the	Spanish	and	UK	constitutional	orders	





















The	reason	being	 that	 in	 those	States,	 there	 is	a	 lack	of	 robust	mechanisms	 for	
the	 collegiate	 representation	of	 the	 regional	 tier	 in	 the	way	 that	 the	Austrian	and	 the	




to	 introduce	 into	 their	 constitutive	 documents	 provisions	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 bilateral	
cooperation	commissions	between	themselves	and	the	metropolitan	State.	An	example	
of	 that	 is	 the	 Generalitat	 –	State	 Bilateral	 Commission	 that	 the	 2006	 Catalan	 Estatut	
provided	 for.	This	Commission	that	was	envisaged	and	designed	solely	by	 the	Catalan	
political	 community	 had	 as	 its	 main	 purpose	 to	 provide	 for	 a	 forum	 for	 policy	







of	 those	 orders	 and	 the	 particular	 role	 that	 the	 (sub-)constitutional	 statutes	 play	 in	
them.	Because	of	their	‘open’	and	‘flexible’	character,	they	are	able	to	adapt	to	the	ever-
changing	political	necessities	of	a	multi-national	State	better	than	if	they	had	adopted	a	
more	 ‘rigid’	 and	 ‘formalised’	 approach	 and	 accommodate	 such	 initiatives	 that	 create	
even	 further	 differentiation	 between	 the	 regions.	 It	 remains	 to	 be	 seen	 whether	 the	
political	 developments	 in	 Catalunya	 and	 Scotland	 will	 cast	 doubt	 over	 this	 ‘optimist’	
reading	of	the	Spanish	and	UK	constitutional	orders.	
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